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The Gulf of Mexico: A Binational Lake Shared by the
United States and Mexico. A Proposal
Professor Jorge A. Vargas*
Recently, the U.S. press reported that four major international oil
corporations, led by the Houston-based giant Shell Oil Corporation, are drilling
a prospective commercial well in the Gulf of Mexico at a depth of 7,625 feet.
This commercial project, known as the Baha Project, is situated in the submarine
region of Alaminos Canyon, 200 miles southeast of Corpus Christi, Texas.2
Since this ambitious Baha Project was announced in February of 1996, it has
attracted unprecedented attention in industrial, technological and diplomatic
circles. This is the first time that four major oil companies joined their tech-
nological expertise in a venture to commercially exploit hydrocarbons and natural
gas located in the deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico. The reason is simple.
Described as "one of the foremost petroleum provinces of the world,"3 the Gulf
of Mexico basin continues to be a unique geological phenomenon.
Technologically, this is the deepest oilfield in the world in the history of the
oil industry. It consists of a submarine well to be drilled in water depths as great
as 7,865 feet (2,394 meters), beyond the continental shelf s edge in the Gulf of
* J.S.D. candidate 1972 and LL.M. Yale Law School, 1969; LL.B Summa cum laude, Mexico's
National Autonomous University School of Law (UNAM), Mexico City, 1964. Professor Vargas served in
numerous capacities with the government of Mexico, including the positions of Legal Advisor, Secretariat of
Foreign Relations (SRE); Deputy Director of International Fisheries, Fishing Department (DePes); and as a
member of the Mexican Delegation to UNCLOS III, 1973-1981. Professor Vargas is currently a Professor of
Law at the University of San Diego School of Law.
This article is based on Professor Vargas' work "Mexico's Legal Regime over Its Marine Spaces: A
Proposal for the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Deepest Part of the Gulf of Mexico," 26 INTER-
AMERICAN L. REv. 2 (winter 1994-95) at 189-242, and an essay on the same topic published in VOICES OF
MExIco. Nos. 36 and 37 (Fall-Winter 1996), CISAN, UNAM, Mexico City, at 76-80.
I. The four corporations are Shell Oil Co., Amoco, Inc., Texaco, Inc. and Mobil, Corp. See Nelson
Antosh, Shell, Partners to Reach New Low in Gulf Drilling, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12, 1996 at 1; Rick
Hogan, Four Major Team Up in Project to Drill Deepest Offshore Well, OIL DAILY, Vol. 46, No. 47, Mar. 12,
1996 at 1; see also Agis Salpukas, Four Oil Companies to Drill Well 7,625 Feet Under Gulf of Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996 at 39.
2. Shell Offshore, a Shell affiliate based in New Orleans, is the operator of the Baha Project. The name
is from the first letter of each company's lease in that area: Shell's Branchiosaurus, Amoco's Anaconda,
Mobil's Hi-C and Texaco's Alpha Centauri. Each of the four companies holds a 25% stake. See Antosh, supra
note 1, at 1.
3. See Richard Nehring, Oil and Gas Resources, in THE GEOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICA, VOL. J: THE
GULF OF MExico BASIN 446 (Amos Salvador ed. 1991).
4. Since the first commercial exploitation for mineral resources took place in the Gulf of Mexico early
this century, this marine basin has maintained its record as "one of the foremost petroleum provinces of the
world." By the end of 1987 this basin had a "demonstrated ultimate known recovery" of 112.7 billion barrels
of crude oil, 22.5 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (for a total of 135.2 billion barrels of petroleum liquids),
and 534.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, for a total of 222.54 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Id.
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Mexico. The existence of vast petroleum potential in the deep-water region of this
basin, especially in the deep abyssal plain, where water depths reach a maximum
of 12,270 feet (3,740 meters), has been known since 1979.5 However, only
recently has the oil industry developed the technology to attempt the commercial
exploitation of these deep water sources of hydrocarbons.
From a diplomatic viewpoint, the drilling activities of the Baha Project con-
stitute sources of grave concern to the government of Mexico.6 Two delicate
technical questions generate these concerns. First, the hydrocarbon deposit Shell
Oil Corporation is targeting in the Alaminos Canyon is just a few miles away
from the maritime boundary agreed to by the United States and Mexico in 1976. 7
The question here is whether the oil deposit in question extends beyond the inter-
national maritime boundary and physically penetrates into a submarine area under
Mexico's sovereignty. In other terms, the hydrocarbons in the Alaminos Canyon
may be a binational submarine area bisected by the international boundary
between the two countries. The hydrocarbons may embrace a submarine area
which is physically located under the control of both the United States and
Mexico.
The second question may be more problematic. Scientific evidence suggests
that the Alaminos Canyon deposit may be contiguous to a much larger source of
hydrocarbons and natural gas located in the central and deepest part of the Gulf
of Mexico. It has been estimated that in the "maritime boundary region of the
Gulf of Mexico, the undiscovered in place resources range from 2.24 billion to
21.99 billion barrels of oil (BBO) and from 5.48 trillion to 44.40 trillion cubic
feet (TCF) of gas."'
The U.S. Department of the Interior determined that "maritime boundary
region" comprised approximately 58,940 square miles (152,660 square kilo-
meters) and was divided into six individual assessment areas on the basis of its
geologic characteristics (See Map No. 1, infra page 481). The Department's
5. Id.
6. See Nick Anderson, Mexico Fears U.S. Drillers will Siphon Off its Oil, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.
Mar. 31, 1996 at 1-2.
7. Exchange of Notes Effecting Agreement on the Provisional Maritime Boundary, Nov. 24, 1976,
U.S.-Mex., 29 U.S.T. 197 [hereinafter Exchange of Notes].
8. See GEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK, PETROLEUM POTENTIAL, PETROLEUM-RESOURCE ESTIMATES,
MINERAL AND GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES, GEOLOGIC HAZARDS, AND DEEP-WATER DRILLING TECHNOLOGY OF
THEMARIIMEBOUNDARYREGIONINTHE GULFOFMEXICO. U.S. DEPARTMENTOFTHEINTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL
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study "focused on factors critical to the generation, migration and entrapment of
hydrocarbons, such as: structural and stratigraphic traps, source beds and thermal
maturation, reservoir rocks and seals, and timing of hydrocarbon migration
relative to formation of traps." 10 The problem is that this oil and gas deposit,
described as the fourth largest in the globe, is situated in a submarine area whose
boundaries were not established by the 1976 agreement.1 To date, no bilateral
agreement exists demarcating the submarine boundary of the continental shelf
between the United States and Mexico.1 2 Moreover, the countries have adopted
a divergent position with regard to the submarine area extending beyond 200
nautical miles in the central part of the Gulf of Mexico.
The legal history of this case traces back to 1976, when both the United
States and Mexico adopted a 200 nautical mile maritime zone offshore. During
this time the international community witnessed the establishment of vast oceanic
areas placed under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. 13 Also during this time, the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS IIl) was engaged in the
process of formulating a most comprehensive legal regime for the world's marine
uses and resources, including the preservation and protection of the marine
environment. 4
10. The oil and gas potential of the six assessment areas in the Maritime Boundary region of the Gulf
of Mexico was analyzed by using "all publicly available geophysical data recorded in the region, supplemented
by a limited amount of geological data obtained from drilling within and adjacent to the area of study."
Geophysical data included "approximately 8,350 nautical miles (15,448 kin) of seismic-reflection profiles
ranging from shallow-penetration recordings to deep-penetration, common-depth-point (CDP) multichannel
profiles." Id. at 3.
11. See GEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. See Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, infra note 20 and accompanying text.
13. The 200 n.m. marine resource area appeared originally in Latin America the "Patrimonial Sea."
Eventually, UNCLOS III included this resource area under the title of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which
was the name given to this area by the African countries. See Francisco Orrego Vicuflia, La Zone Economique
Exclusive: Rigime et Nature Juridique dans le Droit International, 37 RECUEIL DES CouRs, 1986-IV.
MARTINUS, THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS 9-17 (1980).
14. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth
Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L.l. 1-23 (Jan. 1982); Bernard H. Oxman, Introduction: On Evaluating the
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Symposium: Law of the Sea XIV),19 SAN DIEGO LAW REv. 453,453-
60 (Sum. 1982); John R. Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Future of the United Nations Convention on
The Law of The Sea, 88 AM. J. IN'TL L. 488,488-99 (July, 1994).
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During the Carter administration, the United States created a 200 nautical
mile Fishing and Conservation Zone.' 5 Mexico, on the other hand, by amending
Article 27 of its 1917 Constitution, during the administration of President
Echeverria, established a 200 n.m. exclusive economic zone (EEZ) ' 6 The creation
of these zones necessitated that both countries to engage in diplomatic nego-
tiations to establish their respective maritime boundaries, especially in areas like
the Gulf of Mexico where these oceanic zones overlapped.' 7
The United States and Mexico established these boundaries in the Gulf of
Mexico and the Pacific Ocean through an Exchange of Notes in November 24 of
1976.8 Two issues derive from the content of this agreement: First, said
boundaries were considered to have a provisional character;' 9 and second, this
boundary did not apply to the continental shelf.
The same day the Exchange of Notes was entered into, Dr. Alfonso Garcfa
Robles, then Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, sent the U.S. Ambassador
a diplomatic note asserting:
I take the liberty of pointing out that our two countries have not yet
delimited their respective continental shelves beyond twelve nautical
miles seaward from the respective coasts, and that the present arrange-
ment with respect to maritime boundaries, based on the Treaty to Resolve
Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and the
Colorado River as the International Boundary, concluded in 1970, only
extends to the maritime boundary to 12 nautical miles.20
15. See The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Pub. L. 94-265, 16 U.S.C. 1801, §
2 (1984). For a Mexican perspective of this zone, see Jorge A. Vargas, MEXICO YL4 ZONA DE PEScA DE
ESTADOS UNIDOS, UNAM, M6xico, 1979.
16. In symmetry with the substantive work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) and in anticipation of its resulting 1982 Convention, Mexico was a pioneer in establishing
a 200 n.m. EEZ. This was effected by a presidential decree that added a new Eighth paragraph to Art. 27 of
the Constitution. See Diario Oficial (Feb. 6, 1976).
17. Mexico established the outer boundaries of its 200 n.m. EEZ by a presidential decree published in
the Diario Oficial of June 7, 1976. See JORGE A. VARGAS, LA ZONA ECONOMICA EXCLUSIVA DE MEXICO
(Mexico 1980).
18. For an analysis of this agreement, see Jorge A. Vargas. Mexico's Legal Regime Over Its Marine
Spaces. 26 INTER-AM. L. REv. 189, 219-36 (Winter 1994-95).
19. The title of this Exchange refers to the "Agreement on the Provisional Maritime Boundary."
(emphasis added). Id.
20. See Exchange of Notes, supra note 7 at 199 (emphasis added). In response, U.S. Ambassador,
Joseph John Jova agreed with the substance of Dr. Garcfa Robles' note, thus effecting the bilateral agreement.
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This provisional character of the boundaries moved Mexico two years later
to convince the U.S. government to conclude a more formal and permanent
bilateral agreement on maritime delimitation. Thus, on May 4, 1978, during his
visit to Mexico City, then Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, signed a Treaty on
Maritime Boundaries at Tlatelolco, the venue of Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign
Affairs (SRE) on May 4, 1978.21 (See Map No. 2, infra page 482). The
boundaries in this treaty were identical to those in the Exchange of Notes of 1976.
Until now, no attempt has been made by the government of Mexico to explain
its apparent necessity to formally elevate the Exchange of Notes into an agree-
ment as solemn as a treaty. It is possible that Mexico may have been aware of the
mineral riches in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, considering that the 1976
boundaries were only provisional, it decided to sign a treaty believing the con-
stitutional formalities inherent to this instrumend 2 would impose on the United
States a commitment more formal and serious than the one created by a mere
Exchange Notes.23
Paradoxically, this attempt to establish by means of treaty Mexico's maritime
boundaries between 12 and 200 nautical miles seaward led to the current pre-
dicament derived from the Baha Project in the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican
Senate approved the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries in a matter of days. 24 On the
U.S. side, the treaty's constitutional process was rather disappointing for an
expectant Mexico. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably on the
treaty in August of 1980; however, on September 16, 1980, the U.S. Senate
indefinitely postponed consideration of the treaty when questions arose regarding
the presence of rich hydrocarbon and natural gas deposits in the deepest portion
of the Gulf of Mexico.25 Since that hearing sixteen years ago, the treaty has not
received the required advice and consent of the Senate to enter into force. As a
consequence, this imperfect treaty continues to be in a state of legal limbo,
collecting dust in the archives of the U.S. Senate.
26
21. See Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, May 4, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1073, U.S.-Mex.
22. "Treaties" are distinguishable from any other international agreement since they are constitutionally
required to obtain some type of approval from the Senate in order to be valid. See MEX. CONsT. art. 76, para.
I art. 2, § 2 U.S. Const.
23. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). The U.S. Supreme Court determined that
independently of its name, e.g., executive agreement, compromise, convention, modus vivendi, exchange of
notes, etc., an "international compact" or executive agreement entered into by the United States (without
having the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate) is the supreme law of the land and, as such, legally binding
upon the U.S. government.
24. See DECRETO POR EL QUE SE APRUEBA EL TRATADO SOBRE LIMrrES MARrIMOS ENTRE M.xICO Y
LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMIRICA, ToMO CCCLII, 15 DIARtO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACION, Jan. 22, 1979 at
1.
25. See 126 CONG. REC. S12, 711 at 25,500 (1980).
26. Id.
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Dr. Hollis D. Hedberg, a former executive of the Gulf Oil Corporation and
emeritus professor of geology at Princeton University, first called attention to the
geological data which indicated the presence of "some of the most promising,
though very deep water, petroleum-prospective acreage off the U.S. coast
anywhere, in an oceanic area located in the central portion of the Gulf of
Mexico."27
As a result of this statement, which Dr. Hedberg made in 1980 when the U.S.
Senate gave initial consideration to the 1978 Treaty,28 the U.S. Senate requested
the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct a technical assessment of the submarine
area in question. This agency produced a report in 1981 which confirmed the
existence of a deposit of hydrocarbons and natural gas in the deepest portion of
the Gulf of Mexico.29
In late 1976, when Mexico and the United States established a 200 n.m. mari-
time zone along their respective coastlines, this demarcation left a small triangular
area in the central part of the Gulf of Mexico located beyond the outer boundary.
In other words, given the dimensions and physical configuration of this Gulf, a
triangular submarine area located where the respective 200 nautical mile of each
country do not overlap was left in the central part of that oceanic basin. This
submarine triangle resulted because the opposite coasts of the U.S. and Mexico
are more than 400 n.m. apart in that central location. Thus, the submarine area in
question was formed by a 129 nautical mile segment in the north of the Gulf of
Mexico as its base (closely following the 29 Parallel of latitude North) and the
intersection of the two 200 n.m. arcs drawn from the baselines offshore Yucatin
and Texas as its vortex, pointing to the south. The area of this triangle covers
approximately 25,000 square miles.30
According to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
waters in the triangular submarine area form a part of the high seas, which are
"open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked," since they are located beyond
the outer boundary of the 200 n.m.3t The same convention provides that the
27. See THREE TREATIES ESTABLISHING MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND CUBA: HEARINGS ON S. EXEC. REP. No. 96-49 BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 28-33, Hedberg Statement [hereinafter Three Treaties].
28. Id. at 30. See also H.D. Hedberg, Evaluation of the U.S. -Draft Treaty on Boundaries in the Gulf
of Mexico, 14 MARINETECH. SOC'YJ. 1,32,37 (1980).
29. See GEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 8.
30. See Three Treaties, supra 27 at 33.
31. See LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA WITH ANNEXES AND FINAL ACT, arts. 86, 87 (United Nations, N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter LOS Convention].
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submarine area laying at the bottom of the triangle, that is., its seabed and the cor-
responding subsoil, form a part of the International Area, governed by Part XI of
the Convention. 32 The International Area is that part of the seabed and ocean floor
(including the subsoil thereof) located beyond 200 nautical miles and is under the
authority and the exclusive jurisdiction of the International Sea-Bed Authority.33
The United States and Mexico have adopted conflicting legal interpretations
regarding this "submarine triangle," where the U.S. Geological Survey confirmed
the existence of vast mineral resources. For Mexico, this submarine area and its
resources form a part of the International Area, constituting a portion of the
"[c]ommon heritage of humankind. '34 This means, inter alia, that "no State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its
resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part
thereof;' 35 that "[a]ll rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as
a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act;' 36 and that "[n]o State or natural
or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights in respect to the minerals
recovered from the Area except in accordance with this Part [XI]. Otherwise, no
such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be recognized. ' 37 All the
activities taking place in the Area, including the exploration and exploitation of
its resources, as well as marine scientific research,38 are to be carried out "for the
benefit of mankind as a whole,"39 and strictly regulated by the International
Authority.
40
This language of the LOS Convention, as interpreted by Mexico, means that
the United States, or any of its corporations or nationals, cannot explore nor
exploit the mineral resources located within the triangle, nor conduct any marine
scientific research activities in the submarine area.
32. Id. art. 1, par. I. LOS Convention defines "the Area" as "the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." (emphasis added).
33. See id. arts. 136, 156-158, United Nations. New York, 1983 at 2,42 and 52-53.
34. See LOS Convention art. 136.
35. Id. art. 137, para. 1.
36. Id. art. 137, para. 2.
37. Id. art. 137, para. 3.
38. Id. art. 143.
39. Id. art. 140, para. 1.
40. See id. arts. 150-55, 156-69. The International Seabed Authority is formed ipsofacto by all the
States which became a party to the 1982 LOS Convention. Its seat is located in Kingston, Jamaica, and its
principal function is to organize and control any activities affecting the resources of the Area-whether solid,
liquid or gaseous, including polymetallic nodules-in conformity with Part XI of the 1982 LOS Convention.
During the UNLOS III negotiations, the U.S. government strongly opposed Part XI because it disagreed with
the principles and conditions governing the Area and the Authority.
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The architect of Mexico's position was the Legal Advisor (Consultor
Jurdico) of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE) during the administration
of President Miguel de la Madrid.4' However, as of this writing, the government
of Mexico has not officially made public its legal position on this matter.
The United States, contrary to the Mexican thesis, has reiterated in numerous
international fora that it does not accept Part XI of the LOS Convention, in
particular the powers granted to the International Authority and the Enterprise.42
It also rejects the notion that the Area, and its resources, form a part of the com-
mon heritage of humankind.43 Basically, the United States position may be sum-
marized by stating that the seabed and ocean floor, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, is a submarine area subject to the same legal principles that apply to
the high seas.44 In the same fashion that anyone can fish in the high seas, for
example, the United States considers that its corporations and its nationals have
the right to explore and exploit the resources in that submarine area, as well as the
right to conduct marine scientific research activities therein, since they are located
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. For the United States the International
Authority has neither regulatory powers, nor any control over States, its cor-
porations or its nationals, in the conduct of any activities in the so-called Area.
The United States views extracting oil from the deep seabed as legally equivalent
to catching fish from the high seas.
41. This legal thesis was advanced by Dr. Alberto Szdkely Sdnchez, A Commentary with the Mexican
View on the Problem of Maritime Boundaries in U.S.-Mexican Relations, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 155 (1982).
42. See id. arts. 170, 153, para. 2(b). According to Part XI of the LOS Convention, the Enterprise is the
organ of the Authority "which shall carry out activities in the Area directly, as well as the transporting,
processing and marketing of minerals recovered from the Area." The Enterprise is to have "its principal place
of business at the seat of the Authority." In addition to the Enterprise, "activities in the Area shall be carried
out... in association with the Authority by State Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons
which possess the nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when
sponsored by such States . I.." Id
43. John E. Noyes et al., Deep Seabed Mining: The Work of the Preparatory Commission, 82 AM.
SOC'Y INT'LL. PROCED. 80 (April 20-23, 1988); Bernard Herbert Oxman, The High Seas and the International
Seabed Area, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 526 (April 1989); George D. Hainbaugh Jr., Regulation Symposium: Impact
of the Reagan Administration of the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 151 (Winter 1989); American
Society of International Law, United Nations' Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convent on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 33 ILM 1309 (Sept. 1994); Louis B.
Sohn, Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
696 (Oct. 1994).
44. Id. See LOS Convention arts. 86-89, 90-120. The high seas is that part of the oceans placed beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, i.e. beyond 200 nautical miles, which is open to all States, whether coastal
or land locked, and where the following six freedoms are exercised under the conditions established by the
LOS Convention and other rules of international law: (1) of navigation, (2) overflight, (3) to lay submarine
cables and pipelines, (4) to construct artificial islands, (5) of fishing, and (6) of scientific research.
466
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This may be the legal position that Shell Oil Corporation and others will
adopt if the oil deposit located in the submarine triangle of the Gulf of Mexico
offers good commercial prospects. Legally, Shell is expected to strongly embrace
the U.S. position. In this case, Shell would argue that it has the right to conduct
exploratory and exploitation activities including commercial prospecting for oil
and natural gas and conducting marine scientific research in a submarine area of
the world's oceans, provided said area is located beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. This would include the submarine triangle in the central portion of
the Gulf of Mexico.
Consequently, the Baha Project, whose objective is to drill a prospective com-
mercial well in the Alaminos Canyon, may only be the first step in preparing for
commercially exploiting the mineral resources found in the submarine triangular
area. An area which, in accordance with Art. 76(1) of the LOS Convention may
constitute a natural prolongation of the U.S. continental margin and whose outer
edge is located beyond its 200 nautical mile EEZ, as this zone was established in
1983. 45 This is a venture that may become more commercially attractive if the
technology now being tested in the Alaminos Canyon proves successful, and the
mineral resources in the submarine triangle are quantitatively and qualitatively
superior to those in the United States continental shelf.46 Answering these crucial
questions in the affirmative may move Shell Oil Corporation and others to initiate
exploratory operations in the submarine triangle towards the early years of the
next century. However, two key questions remain. First, did Mexico determine
that the "submarine triangle" in the deepest portion of the Gulf of Mexico should
be considered a part of the International Area? Secondly, is this really Mexico's
official position?
45. Proclamation by President Ronald Reagan, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1983. Proclamation No.
5030,48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983). Based on this proclamation the United States adopted a 200 nautical mile
EEZ, asserting rights over living and non-renewable resources, and other actions, in accordance with the 1982
LOS Convention. Legally, the U.S. EEZ replaced the 200 n.m. Fishery Conservation and Management Zone
(Pub. L. No. 94-265, 16 U.S.C., § 1801, (1976),established by President Carter in 1977.
46. See LOS Convention, supra note 31, art. 76 para. 1. (according to Art. 76, para. 1 of the 1982 LOS
Convention, the continental shelf of a coastal state "comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
that extend beyond its territorial sea .... The coastal state exercises over this submarine area "sovereign
rights" for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources; Id. Art. 77, para. 1. These "natural
resources consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms belonging to sedentary species." Id. Art. 77, para. 4. However, these rights "do not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters" and should not "infringe or result in any
unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States." Id. Art. 78, para. 1,
2.
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Pursuant to the 1982 LOS Convention, if the "submarine triangle" is a part
of the International Area neither Mexico, the United States, nor any other nation
can conduct any exploratory or commercial activities in said triangle. Any
exploratory or commercial operations in that triangle should be controlled and
regulated by the International Authority, as mandated by Part XI of the Con-
vention. Under this criterion, the submarine triangle located in the central portion
of the Gulf of Mexico, geographically enclosed by the exclusive economic zones
of the United States and Mexico, would then become a part of the "The Area,"
governed by "The Authority." However, the same Convention may offer a more
practical alternative.
To solve this dilemma, special attention should be given to Art. 76 (1) of the
LOS Convention which classifies the continental shelf into two different cate-
gories. The first kind, which may be described as "physical," and the second as
"legal." This article provides:
[T]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea (A)
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin, or (B) to a distance of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend that
distance.47
This provision is of the utmost importance to any coastal State because its
application determines whether a given State possesses a "legal continental shelf'
of "only" 200 nautical miles, a fact applicable to 90% of all the coastal States at
the global level, or whether its submarine shelf is a "physical continental shelf'
a truly exceptional case in geological terms, whose outer boundary is located
beyond 200 nautical miles. This is a pivotal determination that is bound to
produce profound consequences for the State in question since it affects key areas
of its economy, its industrial base in the oil and petrochemical sectors, its
domestic and international trade, including its scientific and technological
developments and, above all, the well-being of its population. An extended
physical continental shelf rich in hydrocarbons and other mineral resources may
be the clearest avenue to progress, education and political stability for any coastal
State.
47. Id. art. 76(1) (emphasis added).
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Regarding the outer boundary of the continental shelf, Art. 76 (1) of the LOS
Convention may be construed as allowing two different ways of delimiting said
boundary: (1) when the physical continental shelf (including the continental
margin) extends beyond 200 nautical miles.; and (2) when said continental shelf
is rather narrow and does not extend beyond 200 n.m.
In the first case, the coastal State can establish the shelf s outer boundary to
coincide with "the outer edge of the continental margin." From a geological view-
point, this implies that the outer edge of the continental margin is physically
found beyond the 200 nautical miles EEZ limit. Since this determination involves
the presence of an exceptional submarine geological formation, that is, the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,48
extending beyond the 200 nautical miles EEZ limit, the coastal State has the
burden to provide "information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles"49 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
Until the late 1970's, very few coastal States reported having physical con-
tinental shelves extending beyond 100 or 150 nautical miles from shore, such as
Australia, Argentina, Canada, India, Russia and the United States.50 However, as
a result of the impact produced by Art. 76 (1) of the LOS Convention, it is
somewhat surprising to learn that today thirty coastal States-including
Mexico--claim have a continental shelf (including the continental margin)
extending beyond 200 nautical miles.5t
48. Id. art. 76, para. 3. For purposes of the Convention, "the continental margin comprises the
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the
shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil
thereof." Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. art. 2, Annex If. The Commission consists of 21 members who are "experts in the field of
geology, geophysics or hydrogeography, elected by States Parties to this Convention from among their
nationals, having due regard to the need to ensure equitable geographical representation, who shall serve in
their personal capacities." Id. See id. art. 76, paras. 4-8 Annex II: Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf LOS Convention Annex II: Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to be Used in
Establishing the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin, Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Lmv of the Sea. Done at Montego Bay, December 10, 1982; THE LAW OFTHE SEA, supra note 3 1, art. 28,
111-113, 183-184.
50. See Laurent Lucchini and Michel Voelckel, LES ETATS ET LA MER, La Documentation Francaise,
Paris, 1977; see also Tableau 3: Superficies du Plateau Continental et de la Zone Economique at 61-65.
51. These States are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Cook Island, Dominican
Republic, Guyana, Iceland, India, Japan, Ireland, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mynamar, New Zealand,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, South Keits, Sam Lucia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vietnam and Yemen (Information provided to the author by the Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York).
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In the second case, where the physical continental shelf is less than 200 miles,
the LOS Convention allows the coastal State to "legally" extend the outer boun-
dary of the shelf out to 200 nautical miles Thus, regardless of the physical
dimensions of the continental shelf within the 200 nautical miles limit (including
the margin), the Convention creates the legal fiction that the shelf extends out to
200 nautical miles, pursuant to the final part of Art. 76 (1). Incidentally, this
produces the practical result of having the same 200 nautical mile outer limit for
both the "legal continental shelf' and the EEZ.
52
Generally speaking, the continental shelf is the submarine territory of the
coastal State which is under its authority and control for purposes of exploring
and exploiting the natural resources located therein. From a geological viewpoint,
the continental shelves underlie only 7.5% of the total area of the oceans, but they
are equal to eighteen percent of the earth's total land area.53 On a global basis, the
outer edge of the continental shelf ranges in depth from twenty to 550 meters,
with an average of 133 meters; the shelf ranges in width from zero to 1,500
kilometers, with an average of seventy-eight kilometers (approximately fifty-five
miles).
54
When one applies these LOS Convention principles on how to delimit the
continental shelf's outer boundary to the Gulf of Mexico-an oceanic basin
traditionally known for its vast wealth in mineral resources 55-- it becomes evident
the necessity of its basin States to agree on the delimitation of their respective
marine spaces, notably the continental shelf. To date, there is no bilateral agree-
ment between the United States and Mexico which establish those maritime
boundaries. The ambiguity created by the lack of an agreement may evolve into
more delicate and controversial questions in the near future if left untouched. This
may be the case, for example, when one considers the presence of mineral
resources located in the deepest part of the Gulf, beyond the 200 nautical mile
52. The Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an oceanic area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea
where the coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control over its natural resources, whether living
and non-living, recognizing in favor of other States the freedoms of the high seas, except the freedom to fish.
Art. 57 of the LOS Convention provides that the breadth of the EEZ "should not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles." See LOS Convention, supra note 31, art. 57.
53. W.H. Freeman & Co. San Francisco, The Continental Shelves, THE OCEAN K.O. EMERY, 42,42
(Scientific American. Inc. 1969). Scientifically, the continental shelf is defined "as the zone around a continent
extending from the low-water line to the depth at which the ocean bottom slopes markedly downward.
Conventionally, the edge of the shelf is taken to lie at 100 fathoms, or 200 meters, but a more accurate average
for all continents is about 130 meters." Id. at 42-43.
54. Id. at 41.
55. See supra note 4 (explaining recovery efforts in the Gulf of Mexico and potential for extracting
mineral resources).
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exclusive economic zone limit. Another instance arises evaluating the legal
consequences derived from a recent technical study suggesting that Mexico's
natural prolongation of its submarine continental shelf may extend beyond 200
nautical miles.
What would happen if recent geological studies proved that the deepest part
of the Gulf of Mexico is, indeed, a natural prolongation of Mexico's land territory
to the outer edge of the continental margin,56 as provided for by Art. 76 (1) of the
LOS Convention?
Until now, the government of Mexico has maintained the official position that
its continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico is physically narrow, measuring much
less than 200 nautical miles. Technical scientific studies, geological surveys and
core samples conducted in the past have consistently proved that its continental
shelf in the Gulf did not get close, let alone exceed the 200 nautical mile limit.
This assertion can be substantiated by carefully examining any official charts of
the Gulf of Mexico published by the government of Mexico, for example, when
that country established its 200 nautical miles EEZ in 1976. 7 It can also be
assumed that the uniformity and consistency of this traditional but technical
information must have induced Mexico to be of the opinion that its physical
continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico was less than 200 nautical miles
Under this assumption, Mexico declared-through the Legal Counsellor of
Foreign Affairs Secretariat (SRE)-that the triangular submarine area beyond the
200 nautical mile limit in the deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico was not a
physical continental shelf but, rather, a submarine area which was a part of the
"deep ocean floor,"58 thus belonging to the International Area. In other words, this
triangular submarine area was legally acknowledged to be outside that country's
56. See supra 53 (explaining how Mexico has already claimed before the United Nations that its
continental shelf (including the margin) extends beyond 200 nautical miles in the Gulf of Mexico); see also
infra note 75 and accompanying text. The final determination on this claim is to be formally ascertained by
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
57. See Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico's Legal Regime over Its Marine Spaces, 26 INTER-AM. L. R. 189,206-
215 (Winter 1994-95). By a Presidential Decree published in the Diario Oficial of February 6, 1976, Mexico
established a 200 nautical miles Exclusive economic zone through an amendment to Art. 27 of its Constitution.
The outer boundaries of Mexico's EEZ in the Pacific Ocean. the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea were
specified in detail, in coordinates of latitude and longitude, in the Decree published in the Diario Oficial on
June 7, 1976, which entered into force on July 31, 1976. Jointly with this decree, Secretarfa de Marina
(Secretariat of the Navy) published a nautical chart depicting Mexico's EEZ and its outer boundaries, including
the continental shelf.
58. In distinguishing between the "continental margin" and the "International Area," Art. 76 (3) of the
LOS Convention clarifies that the continental margin "does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic
ridges and the subsoil thereof." (Emphasis added).
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national jurisdiction. Mexico likely took this option without realizing that its
determination was technically unsound and scientifically unproven. However,
when Mexico concluded that its physical continental shelf did not reach out to the
200 nautical miles limit some years back, this opinion simply confirmed the
prevailing scientific opinion of the time, a technical opinion which had never been
contradicted until now. Therefore, when this option was taken, in the 80's, there
was no geological data proving that the prolongation of Mexico's land territory
extended to the outer edge of the continental margin, as provided for by the LOS
Convention.
However, to the surprise of the U.S. and Mexican scientific communities,
recent seismic and geological studies conducted by the Department of Geology
of the University of Texas at Austin have characterized the structure of the Gulf
of Mexico basin as a "geological continuum" contained in a semienclosed area.59
The uniqueness of the Gulf's geological structure may be supported by the con-
fluence of several distinct features. First, there are a number of "naturally formed
carbonate platforms, such as those offshore Campeche and Florida."60Second, the
continental margins come from opposite sides of the basins and tend to meet and
merge in the middle of the Gulf.6' This is a very important scientific statement.
In essence, it means that the submarine triangle is located precisely where the
continental margins from the U.S. and Mexico merge in the middle of the basin.
Third, the somewhat semicircular shape of this basin also contributes to its
uniqueness. For millions of years, sediments have gradually covered the Gulf's
submarine topography, from continental shelves and slopes to the abyssal points,
and have concentrated in the deepest part of the Gulf due to the force of gravity.
62
Based on these scientific studies published in 1991, Mexico appears to have
evidence that the submarine triangle is not a part of the International Area.
63
59. See Richard T. Buffler, Seismic Stratigraphy of the Deep Gulf of Mexico Basin and Adjacent
Margins, in THE GEOLOGY OFNORTH AMERICA VOL J: THE GULFOF MEXICO BASIN 353 (Amos Salvador, ed.,
1991).
60. id. at 355.
61. Id. at 377.
62. Id. at 376.
63. See generally id. Although the study produced in 1991 by Dr. Buffler, supra note 59, from the
Geology Department of the University of Texas at Austin, advanced an original and creative conclusion with
respect to the natural prolongation of the continental shelf in the deepest portion of the Gulf of Mexico as a
"geological continuum" formed by the Yucatan shelf, the Florida plain and the West Florida shelf, there is no
doubt that further and more detailed geological studies will be necessary in the near future to reach a definite
and final conclusion. Eventually, it is expected that any future studies and exploratory works in this area will
be conducted not only by academic institutions but especially by private oil companies interested in the
commercial exploitation of the resources located therein.
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Allegedly, it should be geologically characterized as "a natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin," as provided by Art.
76 (1) of the LOS Convention. As a legal consequence of this determination,
Mexico would have the right to exercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the [mineral] resources" located in the submarine
triangle, with the technical restrictions imposed by the Convention.' "From a
part belonging to the International Area, the submarine triangle may now become
a natural prolongation of Mexico's physical continental shelf, subject to that
country's sovereign rights" for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
65resources located therein.
This change of policy by the Mexican government regarding the submarine
triangle may hopefully produce considerable financial benefits for Mexico.
Instead of generously yielding to the International Authority the vast mineral re-
sources located in that submarine area, Mexico may be poised to assert its
sovereign rights to exploit the mineral riches located therein for its own benefit.
Should Mexico officially adopt this policy, as appears to be the case based on
its most recent claim before the United Nations, a number of legal consequences
would arise, some affecting contiguous States-such as the United States and
Cuba-and some touching upon the interests of third States. The most profound
consequence for the United States would be quite unprecedented: the prospect of
legally converting the Gulf of Mexico into a semienclosed ocean basin divided
only between the United States and Mexico.
The legal rationale to reach this intriguing result would go like this: rather
than characterizing the submarine triangle as a part of the International Area,
which would automatically place it under the exclusive jurisdiction of The
Authority in accordance with Part XI of the LOS Convention, Mexico should
instead consider the submarine seabed and subsoil area of that triangle as forming
a part of its continental shelf, pursuant to Art. 76 (1) of that Convention. Whereas
past geological studies traditionally predicated that Mexico's shelf was rather
narrow, recent scientific investigations by a leading U.S. scientific institution
specializing in the geology of the Gulf of Mexico strongly suggest now that
Mexico's continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nautical miles limit.
64. Art. 82 of the LOS Convention provides, inter alia, that "Mhe coastal State shall make payments
or contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." LOS
Convention, supra note 31, art. 82.
65. Id. art. 77 (1).
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Accordingly, it was only logical for Mexico to define its continental shelf as the
submarine area that extends throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin (which in this particular case
is located beyond the 200 nautical miles limit), in strict conformity with said Art.
76(1). It seems that this was precisely the interpretation that motivated Mexico
to file its claim before the United Nations.
Assuming that Mexico's continental shelf goes beyond the 200 nautical miles
of its exclusive economic zone in the central portion of the Gulf of Mexico, they
would then have to diplomatically engage the Untied States in order to negotiate
a commonly agreed continental shelf boundary in that portion of the Gulf. As
indicated earlier,6 this submarine delimitation is the only one awaiting to be
arranged between these two countries. Mexico's change of policy offers a unique
opportunity to settle this question. To an extent, agreeing now on this submarine
boundary would only make successful a task which was left unfinished in 1978
when the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation with Mexico was placed in legal
limbo, and deliberately excluded from the 1976 Exchange of Notes.
It may not be difficult to anticipate how this final bilateral agreement on
maritime delimitation between the U.S. and Mexico would look. From a technical
viewpoint, the maritime boundary in question would highly resemble the already
agreed upon, but incomplete, binational maritime boundary line as it stands today
in the Gulf of Mexico. Probably, the major difference would be that the boundary
line across the Gulf instead of being incomplete, since a portion of it is missing
in its middle today, would be complete and uninterrupted.
It should be explained that when the Exchange of Notes was effected in 1976,
Mexico expressly stated that the maritime boundary agreed then with the United
States "did not apply to the continental shelf."67 At that time, the principal
interest of both nations was simply to establish the binational maritime boundary
between their respective 200 nautical miles EEZ in the Pacific Ocean and the
Gulf of Mexico. Negotiating an additional boundary as technical and complicated
as the submarine area of the continental shelf in the central and deepest portion
of the Gulf would have proven to be too formidable a task.
66. See supra notes 19-27 and the accompanying text (regarding efforts between the U.S. and Mexico
to delineate boundaries of the Continental Shelf).
67. For the text of the Mexican note signed by Dr. Garcfa Robles, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, see
supra note 20.
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Accordingly, the Exchange of Notes of 1976 (and later on the 1978 Treaty)
established the boundary in the Gulf of Mexico as composed of two separate seg-
ments of geodetic lines: 1) an Eastern segment,6 contiguous to the State of Texas
in the United States and the State of Tamaulipas in Mexico; and 2) a Western
segment,69 close to Florida. These two segments, which were demarcated using
points of coordinates of latitude and longitude, were separated by a gap situated
in between them. This gap was indicative of the submarine area whose legal
nature and outer boundary was agreed to be excluded from the negotiation. It may
be added that this gap, which has a length of approximately 128 nautical miles,
is the line that serves as the base of the submarine triangle in the central part of
the Gulf.
The crux of the negotiation between the United States and Mexico in con-
cluding an agreement which will finally complete all the boundaries which exist
between them, consists in reaching an agreement on how to divide that submarine
triangle in a fair and equitable manner between these two nations. A technical and
legal matter of the utmost importance since reaching a successful outcome on this
delicate question would automatically translate into dividing the Gulf of Mexico
between both countries from a legal viewpoint.
What would be the legal consequences of this U.S.-Mexico final maritime
delimitation agreement on Cuba? In 1976, the United States and Cuba already
signed a Treaty establishing the outer maritime boundary of their respective 200
nautical miles EEZ.70 The same year, Mexico and Cuba agreed also on the
maritime boundaries of their 200 nautical mile EEZ, including the continental
shelf.
71
68. The Eastern segment is formed by the following three geodetic lines:
GM.E-I 25 42 13.05 Lat. N. 91 05 24.89 Long. W.
GM.E-2 25 46 52.00 Lat. N 9029 41.00 Long. W
GM.E-3 25 41 56.52 Lat. N 8823 05.54 Long. W.
Exchange of Notes, art. 1, supra note 7.
69. The Western segment is formed by the following four geodetic lines:
GM.W-1 25 58 30.57 Lat. N 9655 2737 Long. W.
GM.W-2 26 00 31.00 Lat. N 9648 29.00 Long. W.
GM.V-3 26 00 30.00 Lat. N. 9539 26.00 Long. W.
GM.W-4 25 59 4828 Lat. N. 9326 42.19 Long. W.
Exchange of Notes, art. 1, supra note 7.
70. Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba,
signed at Washington, D.C. on December 16, 1997, and then extended on December 28-29, 1997 for a further
two year period. See Three Treaties, supra note 27 at 12, 26-28.
71. Canje de Notas que Delimitd la Zona Econ6mica Exclusiva entre Mxico y Cuba (Exchange of
Notes that Delimited the Exclusive Economic Zone between Mexico and Cuba), July 26, 1976. For the text
of this agreement, see VARGAS. LA ZONA ECONOMICA EXCLUSIVA DE MEXIco, supra 17 at 75-76 (Apbndice
7).
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Given the geographical configuration of this semienclosed ocean basin, and
the legal effects produced as a result of this set of bilateral agreements, the way
is clear for dividing the Gulf of Mexico between the United States and Mexico.
Successfully concluding the suggested maritime agreement between these two
nations would convert the Gulf into a virtual binational lake.
However, should Mexico adhere to this attractive legal option, a lot of tech-
nical, legal and diplomatic work must be done. Above all, that country will have
to produce solid and incontrovertible evidence that "the natural prolongation of
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental shelf' actually goes beyond
200 nautical miles, in the central part of the Gulf of Mexico.72 Once this com-
prehensive and financially costly package of technical information is completed,
Mexico will then have to submit it to the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf, in order to obtain the Commission's final and binding recom-
mendations on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of its
continental shelf.73 Armed with this Commission's favorable recommendation,74
Mexico would then have to proceed to demarcate its continental shelf outer
boundaries in the deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico, beyond 200 nautical miles,
in that intriguing submarine triangle area. As suggested earlier, for the
demarcation of this boundary, Mexico is to enter into formal negotiations with the
United States in order to produce a mutually agreeable result. A demarcation
which will have to be followed by its graphic depiction in the corresponding
cartographic maps and nautical charts, including the pertinent geodetic data, to be
published and disseminated at the domestic and international levels.!
5
From an academic perspective, the Baha Project may suggest a number of
specific reflections. Some of them include:
1. Mexico and the United States should finally complete the establish-
ment of all their boundaries, both land and maritime-an effort
72. See LOS Convention supra note 31, art. 76, para. 1.
73. Id., art. 76, paras. 4-8.
74. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is expected to be formed by March of 1997
when its 21 members will be elected. States who are parties to the LOS Convention are currently submitting
names of candidates to the United Nations.
75. In addition to enacting domestic legislation establishing the outer boundaries of its continental
shelves in the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea, Mexico would have to deposit with
the Secretary General of the United Nations "charts and relevant information, including geodetic data,
permanently describing the outer limits of its continental shelf." The U.N. Secretary General is required to give
"due publicity" to these charts and information. See LOS Convention, supra note 31, art. 76, para. 9.
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which was initiated as a result of the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of
1848 and the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. Today, the only boundary
yet to be agreed upon is the continental shelf boundary in the Pacific
Ocean and especially in the Gulf of Mexico.
2. Mexico may consider making its position regarding the submarine
triangle official. In light of the results the Baha Project expects to
accomplish in the near future, Mexico may revisit the legal and tech-
nical complexities associated with the existence of mineral resources
in the central part of the Gulf of Mexico, and the benefits that the
eventual exploitation of these resources may produce for the present
and future generations of Mexicans.
3. The recent filing of Mexico's claim before the United Nations
alleging that its continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico goes beyond
200 nautical miles, suggests a drastic change of policy on this issue.
Should this be the case, this would lead Mexico and the United
States to engage in diplomatic negotiations to finally agree on the
maritime boundary of their respective continental shelves in that
Gulf in the immediate future. The signing of an eventual agreement
on this delicate question would put an end to any concerns associated
with the derailed Treaty on Maritime Delimitation of 1978.
4. The successful conclusion of such an eventual maritime agreement
would automatically lead both countries to consider the Gulf of
Mexico as a virtual binational lake, to be shared principally by the
United States and Mexico. However, in this eventuality, any rights
or interests of third States in said Gulf would have to be identified,
negotiated, recognized and duly clarified.
5. Unlike Mexico, who is a party to the LOS Convention, 76 the United
States "decided not to sign the Convention in 1982 because of flaws
in the regime it would have established for managing the develop-
76. Mexico signed both the Final Act of UNCLOS III and the LOS Convention at Kingston, Jamaica,
on December 10, 1982. Mexico adhered to the Convention on March 18, 1983 and, after the Senate's approval,
promulgated the Convention in the Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n of June 1, 1983. See MEXIco: RELACION
DE TRATADOS EN VIGOR (1993). Secretarfa de Relaciones Exteriores, Tlatelolco, M6xico, D.F., 1993 at 186.
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ment of mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction
(Part XI)."77 However, on July 29, 1994, the United States signed an
agreement which fundamentally changes the deep seabed mining
regime of the Convention in close symmetry with the proposals
advanced by the United States78 As a consequence, it is highly likely
that the United States will soon become a party to the LOS
Convention. 9 If both the United States and Mexico are parties to this
Convention, this would facilitate the reaching of mutually agreeable
solutions regarding the uses and resources of the oceans, including
the conduct of marine scientific research activities.80
6. It may also be in Mexico's interest to enter into an agreement with
the United States regarding the legal r6gime to apply to shared
natural resources bisected by the intemationql boundary between
both countries. The signing of this agreement may receive special
attention when it is considered that such resources consist of
valuable oil and gas deposits or underground aquifers along the U.S.-
Mexico boundary, whether located in the ocean or upon the land
mass.
7. Given the inherent risks associated with the exploration and
exploitation of deposits of natural resources in deepsea areas, such
as the Baha Project, it becomes urgent for Mexico and the United
77. Text of a Letterfrom the President of the United States of America to the U.S. Senate, October 7,
1994. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH SUPP. Feb. 1995, Vol. 6, No. 1. reproduced at 34 I.L.M.1396 (Sept.
1995).
78. The Agreement "meets the objections the United States and other industrialized nations previously
expressed to Part XI. It promises to provide a stable and internationally recognized framework for mining to
proceed in response to future demand for minerals." Id.
79. Annick de Marffy-Mantuano, The Procedural Framework of the Agreement Implementing the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. (Oct. 1995) at 814-824. Agreement of July 29,
1994, see 34 I.L.M. 1393 (1995).
80. Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Marine Scientific Research Activities Offshore Mexico: An Evaluation of
Mexico's Recent Regulatory Legal Framework, 24 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y I (Fall 1995).
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States to evaluate the adequacy of the bilateral agreement of
cooperation regarding marine pollution by discharges of
hydrocarbons and other hazardous substances,81 entered into as a
consequence of the serious environmental damage caused by the
Ixtoc catastrophe some years ago. 2 Neither country can afford
another similar environmental disaster
3
CONCLUSION
The Baha Project in the Gulf of Mexico may be an example on how certain
leading scientific and technological developments produce a direct impact upon
the creation of legal norms, principles and institutions.
This close interaction between science and technology, on the one hand, and
the law, on the other, cannot be more evident than when it relates to the uses and
resources located in the hydrosphere. Thus, the progress science and technology
has given humankind, as one approaches the end of this century, will no doubt
bring a plethora of more formidable challenges when one envisions the begin-
nings of the new millennium. Deepsea drilling for oil and natural gas; exploratory
activities, prospecting and commercial exploitation of polymetallic nodules in
submarine areas within the coastal state's exclusive economic zones, including
the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; generation
of electricity by marine-propelled forces, whether consisting of air, currents or
waves; and even the coastal emplacement of submarine habitats, where scientists,
environmentalists or miners will use them to work, are well-known examples of
new technological vistas that are bound to create new laws.
Notwithstanding these somewhat fantastic projections, the Baha Project may
have played a decisive role in the development of one of the most unprecedented
legal notions in the history of the United States and Mexico: the division of the
Gulf of Mexico between these two nations.
The recent filing by the government of Mexico before the United Nations
claiming that its continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico exceeds the 200 nautical
mile limit, opens a unique opportunity for the United States not only to support
81. Agreement of Cooperation regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of
Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances, with Annexes. July 24, 1980, U.S. - Mex. 32 U.S.T. 5899.
82. The "Ixtoc r' was one of 158 exploratory wells drilled by PEMEX on the continental shelf off the
coast of Campeche, 58 miles northwest of Ciudad del Carmen, in the Gulf of Mexico.The well blew after
several months of drilling, on June 3, 1979, spilling million of barrels of crude oil for the next ten months in
that ocean basin. Given the marine currents in that area, the oil invaded Texas and Louisiana, causing severe
damage to the hotel and shrimp industries in those States. The Capping ofIxtoc. R&D MExIco 16 (Oct. 1980).
83. James M. West, The Ixtoc I Oil Spill Litigation: Jurisdictional Disputes at the Threshold of
Transnational Pollution Responsibility, 16 TEx. INT'L L. J., 475,475-532, (Summer 1981); see also William
J. McDonald, Ixtoc I: hternational and Domestic Remedies for Transboundary Pollution hijur,. 49 FORDHAM
L. REv. 404-31 (Dec. 1980)
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Mexico's claim but to technically assist this country in proving that geological
assertion to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Mexico's
drastic change of policy, abandoning the idea that the submarine area in the
central portion of that Gulf, beyond the 200 nautical miles limit, should be con-
sidered a part of The Area, places Mexico's policy closer to the U.S. official
policy. Thus, both countries should consider entering into negotiations to define
the legal status of the submarine triangle and proceed, as soon as practicable, to
establish the binational boundary of the outer limits of the continental shelf in the
deepest part of the Gulf of Mexico.
Reaching an agreement on this submarine maritime boundary would auto-
matically lead both countries to convert the Gulf of Mexico into a virtual U.S.-
Mexico binational lake.
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